THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ISLAMIC STATE.... PEDE A QUELCOÑO QUE TE LEYA ESTO Ó ANALFABRUTUS VON BERTRAND the thesis is "simplistic" or "schematic" or "deterministic" or whatever other bombastic term pseudo-intellectuals (and legitimate intellectuals alike) choose to use, but one has to understand that the project of this book is to make some sort of reasonably defensible generalization about what leads to the fall of great powers throughout history. That's not exactly easy. No single explanation will be perfect. But his thesis about imperial overstretch is instructive and a useful lens through which to view the powers over the years. His predictions, as we have seen, have proven far from true, but, hey, he's a historian, not a clairvoyant. If masterful analysis of the past meant accurate prediction of the future, things would be very different. The real strength of this book is not even in its overarching argument but in the sheer synthesis and presentation of so much useful data about great powers from 1500-2000. It's not easy to find a one-stop book for economic and military data on 16th-century imperial Portugal and 1950s USSR, but this book has it---Kennedy argues that the strength of a Great Power can be properly measured only relative to other powers, and he provides a straightforward and persuasively argued thesis: Great Power ascendancy (over the long term or in specific conflicts) correlates strongly to available resources and economic durability; military overstretch and a concomitant relative decline are the consistent threat facing powers whose ambitions and security requirements are greater than their resource base can provide for (summarized on pages 438–9). Throughout the book he reiterates his early statement (page 71): "Military and naval endeavors may not always have been the raison d'être of the new nations-states, but it certainly was their most expensive and pressing activity", and it remains such until the power's decline. He concludes that declining countries can experience greater difficulties in balancing their preferences for guns, butter and investments. Kennedy states his theory in the second paragraph of the introduction as follows. The "military conflict" referred to in the book's subtitle is therefore always examined in the context of "economic change." The triumph of any one Great Power in this period, or the collapse of another, has usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces; but it has also been the consequences of the more or less efficient utilization of the state's productive economic resources in wartime, and, further in the background, of the way in which that state's economy had been rising or falling, relative to the other leading nations, in the decades preceding the actual conflict. For that reason, how a Great Power's position steadily alters in peacetime is as important to this study as how it fights in wartime. Kennedy adds on the same page. The relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant, principally because of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the technological and organizational breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society than to another. Early modern era[edit] The book starts at the dividing line between the Renaissance and early modern history—1500 (Chapter 1). It briefly discusses the Ming (page 4) and Muslim worlds (page 9) of the time and the rise of the western powers relative to them (page 16). The book then proceeds chronologically, looking at each of the power shifts over time and the effect on other Great Powers and the "Middle Powers". Kennedy uses a number of measures to indicate real, relative and potential strength of nations throughout the book. He changes the metric of power based on the point in time. Chapter 2, "The Habsburg Bid for Mastery, 1519–1659" emphasizes the role of the "manpower revolution" in changing the way Europeans fought wars (see military revolution). This chapter also emphasizes the importance of Europe's political boundaries in shaping a political balance of power. "The argument in this chapter is not, therefore, that the Habsburgs failed utterly to do what other powers achieved so brilliantly. There are no stunning contrasts in evidence here; success and failure are to be measured by very narrow differences. All states, even the United Provinces, were placed under severe strain by the constant drain of resources for military and naval campaigns... The victory of the anti-Habsburg forces was, then, a marginal and relative one. They had managed, but only just, to maintain the balance between their material base and their military power better than their Habsburg opponents." (page 72) first edition cover art European imperialism[edit] The Habsburg failure segues into the thesis of Chapter 3, that financial power reigned between 1660 and 1815, using Britain, France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia to contrast between powers that could finance their wars (Britain and France) and powers that needed financial patronage to mobilize and maintain a major military force on the field. Kennedy presents a table (page 81, Table 2) of "British Wartime Expenditures and Revenue"; between 1688 and 1815 is especially illustrative, showing that Britain was able to maintain loans at around one-third of British wartime expenditures throughout that period Total Wartime Expenditures, 1688–1815: 2,293,483,437 Pounds, Total Income: 1,622,924,377 Pounds, Balance Raised by Loans: 670,559,060 Pounds, and Loans as % of Expenditure: 33.3% The chapter also argues that British financial strength was the single most decisive factor in its victories over France during the 18th century. This chapter ends on the Napoleonic Wars and the fusion of British financial strength with a newfound industrial strength. Industrial Revolution[edit] Kennedy's next two chapters depend greatly upon Bairoch's calculations of industrialization, measuring all nations by an index, where 100 is the British per capita industrialization rate in 1900. The United Kingdom grows from 10 in 1750, to 16 in 1800, 25 in 1830, 64 in 1860, 87 in 1880, to 100 in 1900 (page 149). In contrast, France's per capita industrialization was 9 in 1750, 9 in 1800, 12 in 1830, 20 in 1860, 28 in 1880, and 39 in 1900. Relative shares of world manufacturing output (also first appearing on page 149) are used to estimate the peaks and troughs of power for major states. China, for example, begins with 32.8% of global manufacturing in 1750 and plummets after the First Opium War, Second Opium War and Taiping Rebellion to 19.7% of global manufacturing in 1860, and 12.5% in 1880 (compared to the UK's 1.9% in 1750, growing to 19.9% in 1860, and 22.9% in 1880). 20th century[edit] Measures of strength in the 20th century (pages 199–203) use population size, urbanization rates, Bairoch's per capita levels of industrialization, iron and steel production, energy consumption (measured in millions of metric tons of coal equivalent), and total industrial output of the powers (measured vs. Britain's 1900 figure of 100), to gauge the strength of the various great powers. Paul also gave emphasis on Productivity Increase based on systematic interventions which lead to Economic Growth & Prosperity to Great Powers in the 20th century. He compares the Great Powers at the close of the 20th century and predicts the decline of the Soviet Union, the rise of China and Japan, the struggles and potential for the European Economic Community (EEC), and the relative decline of the United States. He highlights the precedence of the "four modernizations" in Deng Xiaoping's plans for China—agriculture, industry, science and military—deemphasizing military while the United States and the Soviet Union are emphasizing it. He predicts that continued deficit spending, especially on military build-up, will be the single most important reason for decline of any Great Power. On the United States[edit] From the Civil War to the first half of the 20th century, the United States' economy benefited from high agricultural production, plentiful raw materials, technological advancements and financial inflows. During this time the U.S. did not have to contend with foreign dangers. From 1860 to 1914, U.S. exports increase sevenfold and result in huge trading surpluses. By 1945, the U.S.' economy enjoyed both high productivity and was the only major industrialized nation intact after World War II. From the 1960s onwards, the U.S. saw a relative decline in its share of world production and trade. By the 1980s, the U.S. experienced declining exports of agricultural and manufacturing goods. In the space of a few years, the U.S. went from being the largest creditor to the largest debtor nation. At the same time the federal debt was growing at an increasing pace. This situation is typical of declining hegemons. The United States has the typical problems of a great power which include balancing guns and butter and investments for economic growth. The U.S.' growing military commitment to every continent (other than the Antarctica) and the growing cost of military hardware severely limits available options. The author compares the U.S.' situation to Great Britain's prior to World War I. He comments that the map of U.S. bases is similar to Great Britain's before World War I. As the military expenses grow this reduces the investments in economic growth, which eventually "leads to the downward spiral of slower growth, heavier taxes, deepening domestic splits over spending priorities, and weakening capacity to bear the burdens of defense." Mr. Kennedy's advice is as follows.....RUN THAT THE ISLAMIC STATE AS 1,600,000,000 ECONOMIC DRONES ....AND EACH YEAR THEY HAVE MORE GAMA GUY'S OU ESCREVE-SE GAY'S

 Thirty years ago it was already evident that the United States transforming from being the world's greatest creditor to it's greatest debtor, further diverting the underlying economic power.

America is facing great challenges, and although not simple (neither Kennedy nor HITLER OR OBAMA CAN YES THEY CAN'T presume to make suggestions), it must be faced that the United States' position in the world is in flux and changing, and probably declining. However, her resources, and size will continue to be great, providing an excellent foundation to meet the challenges of a changing world--provided her leaders can strike the best balance between "guns and butter MORE GUNS AND LESS BUTTER PLEASE THAT THE AMERICAN'S ARE FAT BASTARDS .....TEXARCANA PORTUGUESE FAT BASTARDS INCLUDED...

VIVA LA REVOLUCIÓN ----VIVA ZAPATA

EL NUEVO MEXICO INDA SERÁ NOSSO OUTRA VEZ...

It covers the economic and military reasons for the rise and fall of great powers. It is Eurocentric and covers the rise of Elizabethan England, the decline of Spain, the rise of Napoleon, the rise of Germany, the decline of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires, the rise of the United States and Japan, and the Decline of the British Empire. The final chapter on the bipolar world of the USSR and US has been eclipsed by events, but the earlier chapters are a must read. Far from being a geographic determinist like Mackinder and Jared Diamond, Kennedy does deal effectively with the contributions of culture and polity to the rise and fall of nations without descending to a Gibbon-style rant on decadence

China: Orientalist despotism, a unitary China, the decision to scrap the treasure fleets, persecution of merchants, an ethos not focused on competition or accumulation of wealth, state-directed investments.

Europe: political fragmentation, merchants could do their thing, embrace of competition and accumulation of wealth.

But then he cites as reasons for spain's decline: political fragmentation leading to lack of cohesion internal trade barriers and ineffective tax mechanisms...  



A 709 PAGES BIBLE BELT IN A SPACE-TIME CONTINUUM OR CON TI NUA OF FIVE HUNDRED YEARS HALF MILLENIA 500-year history of grand strategy in world history, as first one European empire followed by another tried to achieve the perfect synthesis of absolute security and prosperity, and in the process scaring the hell out of smaller states who would combine to bring down the threatening giant. As such state/empires reached their peak, they would be beset by a plethora of competing priorities. If left alone, each threat would impeach the empire's raison d'etre, showing a weakness that others could exploit. That leads to "imperial overstretch," as the empire strains to resolve every crisis, and in the end go broke, its bankruptcy leading to decline.

"Rise and Fall of Great Powers" came out towards the end of the Cold War, when American economic supremacy was questioned by the expensive military need to contain the Soviet Union worldwide. Japan was rising economically, perhaps moving into a position where it could overtake the US. Recent history proved otherwise, but Kennedy should be given credit for daring to "swing for the fences", even though he got the forecast wrong.

In the end, the book is still a useful guide that explains how states work to increase their economic and military power, trying to build on their strengths while masking their weaknesses. Kennedy's prose can be quite dense at times, but the reader is encouraged to hack their way through the thicket. The facts do come together in the end...AND NO SOUL SURVIVE