By mid-2008, Russia’s currency reserves were the third highest in the world, behind only China and Japan. As an article in The National Interest in January 2009 noted: with a substantial amount of those funds held in the form of US government securities, Russia joined [China and Japan] as a leading financier of the US current-account deficit. It was a dramatic reversal of fortune over the course of a decade In addition, Russia’s nominal dollar GDP increased by more than eight times from 1999 to 2008. Meanwhile, Russia’s stock market capitalisation was over $1 trillion, the highest among the emerging markets. It achieved balance of payments surpluses every year since 2000 and between July 1999 and July 2008 its foreign exchange reserves grew from $12 billion to almost $600 billion In Europe fears of overdependence on Russian energy have mounted in recent years, particularly in light of what some see as Moscow’s increased use of energy as a tool for achieving its foreign policy goals. Russia’s gas dispute with Ukraine in January 2006 heightened Europe’s concerns over the reliability of Russia as an energy supplier. Fears of overdependence also stem from Moscow’s concerted attempts to acquire “down stream” assets in Europe, including pipelines, refineries, storage facilities and other infrastructure, which promise to increase Russia’s already sizeable influence over the European energy market with as yet unclear implications for European foreign policy. The issue of energy security and Moscow’s use of oil and gas as agents of Russian foreign and security policy have become major issues in Russian-European relationsThe West, in general, and the United States, in particular, constitute the central elements in the framing of Russian diplomacy. Russia’s policies around the world, including those towards the former Soviet states on its borders, are shaped profoundly by the dynamics of Moscow’s relationship with Washington. Framing its diplomacy by reference to the United States is in keeping with Russia’s image of itself as one of the world’s great powers. Russia’s relationship with the United States has been characterised by cycles of great expectations and profound disappointments. Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton sought to forge a strategic partnership but these hopes foundered on clashes of national interests over NATO enlargement and the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya. The Putin-Bush years repeated the cycle: from hailing the consummation of a strategic partnership in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the relationship deteriorated to a position of bitterness and recrimination in 2008 following the conflict in Georgia, US plans for missile defence and unilateral US military action in Iraq. President Obama’s stated desire to “reset” US-Russian relations and the agreements reached between the new US president and his Russian counterpart in their first summit meeting in London in April 2009, appear to signal a new start in the bilateral relationship. However, despite the positive rhetoric, a number of contentious issues continue to divide Moscow and Washington. NATO expansion into areas Moscow considers its natural sphere of influence is a powerful and enduring irritant in the broader relationship between Russia and the West, as the conflict in Georgia starkly demonstrated. Russia favours the subordination of NATO to some new pan-European security structure. The Alliance’s eastwards expansion is seen by many in Russia as evidence of the West’s continuing determination to take advantage of Russian weakness and to contain and encircle Moscow. The conflict in Georgia led to a breakdown in NATO-Russian relations. There are signs that the relationship has started to recover, but Moscow remains highly suspicious of NATO and seems determined to prevent both Georgia and Ukraine from becoming members of the Alliance. In the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia, relations between Russia and the West reached their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. The conflict was both a direct cause of heightened tension and a reflection of a longer-term deterioration in the relationship that had been increasingly evident in recent years. In dealing a sudden shock to European security, the events of August 2008 had the effect of refocusing attention on the West’s relationship with Moscow. The conflict in the Caucasus initially led to further strains in relations, but eight months on, it has prompted renewed reflection on Russian foreign policy, its aims, sensitivities and motivating factors. In order to understand the direction of contemporary Russian foreign policy, it is necessary to appreciate the domestic context of diplomatic decision-making. Foreign policy in Russia has long been the preserve of the Kremlin which exercises near exclusive control over the diplomatic decision-making process. Yet, despite the institutional arrangements which formally govern foreign policy decision-making, arguably the greatest single determinant of contemporary Russian policy is the evolving relationship between Russia’s new president, Dmitri Medvedev, and his predecessor, and now prime minister, Vladimir Putin. Understanding the dynamics of that relationship is essential in any analysis of Russian foreign policy. Since Medvedev succeeded Putin as president, commentators initially saw Medvedev as little more than a Putin stooge, but over the past year – and particularly since the onset of the global financial crisis in late 2008 – it appears that Medvedev is beginning to emerge from the shadow of his mentor. During his eight-year presidency, Vladimir Putin undertook a series of steps to consolidate and extend the power of the Russian state and, within it, the authority of the Kremlin. By the close of the Putin presidency, Russia’s retreat from democracy had emerged as one of the most contentious issues in Moscow’s relationship with the West. As well as augmenting the power and authority of the state, the Kremlin’s policies have sought to limit foreign influence in internal Russian matters. To this end, Putin advanced the concept of “sovereign democracy” to describe Russia’s own unique brand of democratic development, shake off the tutelage of the West and to preserve Russian autonomy. In economic policy, too, the pursuit of national sovereignty and autonomy characterised Putin’s approach. The remarkable transformation of Russia’s economy over the past decade enabled the Kremlin to pursue an increasingly independent foreign policy. Rehabilitating the economy was one of Putin’s key priorities. In the ten years following the 1998 economic Donaldson, Robert H. Nogee, Joseph L. Subject(s): 1. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--FOREIGN RELATIONS 2. USSR--FOREIGN RELATIONS Notes: Includes index. 'This book traces the lineage and evolution of Russian foreign policy to the present day, highlighting the continuities in Russia's behavior in the world, as well as the major sources of change and variability. The fourth edition includes coverage of ongoing issues connected with NATO expansion, the status of secessionist territories, responses to international terrorism, disputes over military installations and missile defense systems, and global issues of access to oil and gas supplies and other natural resources.''After the collapse of the Soviet Union expectations were high in both Russia and the West that a 'new world order' was emerging in which Russia and the other former Soviet republics would join the Western community of nations. That has not occurred. A group of analysts from Russia, Europe and North America explains here the reasons for this failure and assesses likely future developments in that relationship. The authors explore the importance of Western policies in the 1990s in 'nationalizing' Russian views of their interests; the commitment of President Putin to rebuilding Russia as a great power (beginning in former Soviet space); and the deterioration of Russian relations with the European Union and the United States during the first decade of the 21st century

Russian Energy Security and Foreign Policy - Abingdon, UK : Routledge. 
 xv, 253 p. : ill.; 24 cm. 
 (Routledge/GARNET Series : Europe in the World ; 13) 
 ISBN: 9780415547338 
 Subject(s): 
 1. ENERGY POLICY--RUSSIA (FEDERATION) 
 2. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS 
 3. FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS--FOREIGN RELATIONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION) 
 4. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 5. ENERGY SECURITY--RUSSIA (FEDERATION) 
 Added entry(s): 
 1. Dellecker, Adrian, ed. 
 2. Gomart, Thomas, ed. 
 Notes: 
 Bibliography: p. 238-246. Includes index. 
 'This book provides an original and thoroughly academic analysis 
 of the link between Russian energy and foreign policies in 
 Eurasia, as well as offering an interpretation of Russia's 
 coherence on the international stage, seeking to understand 
 Russia and explain its behaviour. The authors analyse both 
 energy and foreign policies together, in order to better grasp 
 their correlation and gain deeper understanding of broader 
 geopolitical issues in Eurasia at a time when things could go very very COLD 

Russia as a power to be reckoned with, and establishing an international system akin to 
the great power politics of the 19th century. According to Trenin: 
Briefly put, Moscow is trying to replay the end of the Cold War. This is not to say 
that the Kremlin seeks to revive the Soviet Union, establish garrisons on the Elbe 
and the Vistula or re-enter Afghanistan. Moscow seeks an equal footing with the 
West and recognition as a power centre in the region that stretches from the 
European Union to China’s borders and from the North Pole to the Middle East. 
Unlike the Cold War era, the new round of Russian-Western relations is not 
necessarily a zero-sum game; but unlike the period of ‘strategic partnership’, the 
relationship is no longer thought of in terms of win-win. This new round is closer to 
the late 19th century model, with the great powers simultaneously partners and 

rivals, avoiding full-scale conflict OR NOT....

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